As Sudan marks four years since the October 2021 military coup that derailed its fragile transition to democracy, the nation remains mired in a devastating civil war that erupted in April 2023. What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—known as Hemedti—has evolved into a protracted conflict characterized by ethnic violence, foreign meddling, and a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented scale. By November 2025, the war has claimed over 150,000 lives, displaced more than 12 million people, and pushed 25 million into extreme hunger, with famine gripping parts of Darfur. Despite numerous mediation attempts, peace remains a distant mirage, thwarted by diverging interests, military stalemates, and the internationalization of the conflict.
The roots of this chaos trace back to the 2019 revolution that toppled longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir, ushering in hopes for civilian rule. However, the military’s grip tightened with the 2021 coup, where Burhan and Hemedti initially collaborated to sideline civilians. Tensions simmered over the integration of the RSF— a force born from the notorious Janjaweed militias implicated in the Darfur genocide of the early 2000s—into the regular army. Disagreements on timelines and command structures boiled over into open warfare in Khartoum, rapidly spreading to Darfur, Kordofan, and other regions. The conflict has not only pitted two well-armed factions against each other but has also reignited ethnic fault lines, with the RSF accused of genocidal acts against non-Arab communities in Darfur, including mass killings and sexual violence.
One primary reason peace has proven elusive is the irreconcilable positions of the warring parties themselves. The SAF and RSF have repeatedly ruled out negotiations, viewing the conflict as an all-or-nothing battle for dominance. The SAF insists on maintaining its monopoly over military reforms and demands the RSF’s withdrawal from key areas like El Fasher and North Kordofan before any talks. In contrast, the RSF seeks equal status in negotiations, pushing for a comprehensive restructuring of Sudan’s security apparatus that would preserve its autonomy. This gap widened further in 2025, as the RSF consolidated gains in Darfur, capturing El Fasher in October after an 18-month siege that resulted in over 2,000 civilian deaths. The SAF, meanwhile, recaptured parts of Khartoum and Gezira State earlier in the year, including the presidential palace and Wad Madani, bolstering its refusal to compromise. Both sides have exploited temporary truces to rearm and launch offensives, as seen when the RSF intensified drone attacks on Khartoum following stalled talks.
External interventions have further complicated resolution, transforming Sudan’s strife into a proxy war that mirrors broader regional rivalries. The RSF receives substantial support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has funneled arms, drones, and mercenaries through Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic, enabling its territorial expansions. On the other side, the SAF benefits from backing by Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, with Iranian drones and Egyptian jets tipping battles in its favor. These foreign patrons not only supply advanced weaponry—making the war more destructive—but also pursue their own agendas. The UAE aims to dismantle Islamist influences tied to the former Bashir regime, while Egypt prioritizes preserving state institutions under SAF control to prevent instability spilling over its borders. This polarization has led to a scramble for influence in the Horn of Africa, with middle powers like the UAE and Saudi Arabia filling the vacuum left by diminished U.S. engagement. The result is a conflict that no single actor can control, as external backers enable both sides to sustain fighting without facing decisive defeat.
Mediation efforts, hampered by these dynamics, have consistently faltered. The Quad—a coalition comprising the U.S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—represents the latest attempt to broker peace, but internal divisions undermine its effectiveness. Egypt and the UAE clash over priorities: Cairo supports bolstering the SAF to maintain order, while Abu Dhabi focuses on excluding Islamists from any post-war settlement, fearing their links to Iran and terrorist groups. Saudi Arabia, wary of UAE dominance, has hesitated to fully commit, and the U.S. has limited its role to avoid escalating tensions. A September 2025 roadmap proposed a three-month humanitarian truce leading to a civilian-led government, but it was swiftly dismissed by Burhan, and the RSF pressed ahead with offensives like the El Fasher invasion just days after a Quad meeting in Washington. Previous initiatives, such as the U.S.-Saudi Jeddah talks in 2023, IGAD-led efforts in East Africa, and Swiss negotiations in 2024, failed due to sidelined key actors, insufficient pressure, and competing frameworks. Peacemaking has shifted from ambitious comprehensive deals—like the 2005 accord that ended Sudan’s previous civil war—to mere ceasefires that freeze the fractured status quo, reflecting the lowered expectations amid entrenched interests.
The humanitarian crisis exacerbates the impasse, creating a vicious cycle where suffering fuels recruitment and resentment. Over 33,000 people fled El Fasher in October 2025 alone, enduring desert treks marked by starvation, rape, and mutilation, while millions in IDP camps like Zamzam face famine, consuming animal fodder for survival. Disease outbreaks, including cholera and malaria, have claimed tens of thousands more, with infrastructure destruction compounding the toll. The SAF’s expulsion of World Food Program officials in October, accusing them of bias, has jeopardized aid delivery, while both sides weaponize humanitarian access—blocking corridors and looting supplies. This desperation has drawn in local militias and ethnic groups, fragmenting the battlefield further. For instance, the RSF’s alliances with groups like the SPLM-N in South Kordofan and Darfur’s Joint Protection Force have expanded the war’s scope, making inclusive talks even harder.
Internal Sudanese factors, including economic collapse and historical grievances, also perpetuate the strife. The economy contracted by 40% in 2023, with further declines in subsequent years, leaving citizens impoverished and vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups promising protection or livelihoods. In Darfur, where the RSF’s roots lie, ethnic cleansing campaigns against Masalit and other non-Arab communities echo the 2003 genocide, eroding trust and complicating reconciliation. The SAF’s reliance on Islamist allies from the former Bashir era adds another layer, as mediators like the Quad insist on their exclusion, clashing with the army’s need for frontline support.
Looking ahead, the prospects for peace appear dim without a radical shift. The war’s internationalization suggests it could drag on, setting the stage for de facto partition— with the RSF establishing a parallel government in Darfur and the SAF holding the east. To break the deadlock, unified external pressure is essential: cutting arms flows, imposing targeted sanctions on backers like the UAE, and centering talks on civilian inclusion. Yet, as middle powers vie for influence and U.S. clout wanes, such coordination seems unlikely. Sudan’s four years of chaos underscore a broader trend in African conflicts: messy, proxy-driven wars resistant to resolution, where human suffering becomes collateral in geopolitical games. Until the incentives for fighting outweigh those for peace, the elusive dream of stability will remain just that—a dream deferred amid the rubble of a shattered nation.
